So Let's Look at this Preemption Thingy.
First, there is a presumption that Congress does not intend to displace state law. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) , and "the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Medtronic, Inc. v. Lor, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) .
Second, "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case." Id. A court, looking to the language of the statute, should seek "a fair understanding of congressional purpose." Id. at 486.
CAN-SPAM reads: "This chapter supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits falsity or deception of any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto." 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1).
Got that? CAN-SPAM is designed to combat spam. The states can regulate email fraud.
But the Oklahoma statute has wonderfully vague language making it unlawful to send email that "contains false ... or misleading information..."
The Oklahoma language goes beyond fraud which applies to lies about material facts -matters at the heart of the contract -lies designed to lure a victim into the contract because they go to what he desires.
"You asked to be on our email list," is not a lie about a material fact. It will not make you rush to sign up for a cruise.
Which is to say the Oklahoma statute includes immaterial misrepresentations -which includes any little silly thing. But the CAN-SPAM Act preempts the immaterial lies.
The federal Act says states can prohibit "falsity or deception" in commercial email. "Deception" requires intent, but "falsity" can mean merely "not conforming to the truth." Or it can also convey that tortious intent.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged 820 (1971).
The Fourth Circuit chose to read "falsity" not in isolation, but as part of the whole clause. This adheres to the maxim of noscitur a sociis -a word is generally known by the company it keeps. See, e.g., Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) .
I've always had trouble with the word "sublime," but this noscitur thing seems to approach it.
So falsity is linked to deception as a false statement tort -which is to say fraud. CAN-SPAM was not allowing states to outlaw mere errors that do not rise to the level of a tort.
Benefits and Burdens
Congress was balancing the preservation of a useful commercial tool and the prevention of its abuse. Inexpensive email was a boon to commerce, but the state regulations were a patchwork mess.
Which is to say this is an area that is truly interstate commerce in the original intent of the Commerce Clause rather than the anything-that-exists-has-an-impact-on-commerce modern interpretation.
The Mummagraphics take on CAN-SPAM language was that insignificant errors could be outlawed by the states. This would undermine the Act and impede "unique opportunities for the development and growth of frictionless commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a). The Mummagraphics loophole would allow the states to make all errors in commercial email actionable.
Commercial email is disseminated widely by a mouse-click into the laws of all jurisdictions. A sender would have to abide by the law of the most stringent jurisdiction.
i.e. the nuttiest state. Any candidates?
The regulation of interstate commerce implicitly prohibits states from passing a law that "unduly burdens interstate commerce and thereby 'impedes free private trade in the national marketplace. '" GMC v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997) .
Email addresses do not identify specific locations, so it is difficult to know what laws apply. Civil liability for false statements can squelch innocent speech. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-73 (1964 
